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Abstract
This paper investigates some of the philosophical and conceptual issues raised by the
search for a quantum theory of gravity. It is critically discussed whether such a theory is
necessary in the first place, and how much would be accomplished if it is eventually
constructed. I argue that the motivations behind, and expectations to, a theory of
quantum gravity are entangled with central themes in the philosophy of science, in
particular unification, reductionism, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. I
further argue that there are –contrary to claims made on behalf of string theory –no
good reasons to think that a quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, will provide a
theory of everything, that is, a fundamental theory from which all physics in principle
can be derived.
1. Introduction
One of the outstanding tasks in fundamental physics, according to many theoretical
physicists, is the construction of a quantum theory of gravity. The so far unsuccessful
attempt to construct such a theory is an attempt to unify Einstein's general theory of
relativity with quantum theory (or quantum field theory). While quantum gravity aims
to describe everything in the universe in terms of quantum theory, the purpose of the
closely related project of quantum cosmology is to describe even the universe as a
whole as a quantum system. At present, a quantum theory of gravity is mainly sought
along two avenues (both of which are associated with a number of technical and
conceptual problems). The first of these is canonical quantum gravity in which the
classical Einstein equations are somehow quantized.1 The second, and most popular,
program for quantum gravity is that of string theory. Contrary to canonical quantum
gravity, string theory aims to unite the description of gravity with those of the other
forces in nature (electromagnetic, weak, and strong forces), and is in this sense the most
ambitious attempt of a quantized theory of gravity. Thus, string theory not only
postulates (like canonical quantum gravity) unification in the sense that all forces are
quantum in nature but also that all the quantum forces can be derived from one single
theory. String theory is therefore often referred to as a candidate for a theory of
everything.
1 Such a quantization might be carried out e.g. by making the space-time metric a quantum operator. In a
sense this amounts to a ‘discretization’ of space and time insofar as one can at al speak of space and time 
in quantum gravity (see below). For a good popular introduction to the different approaches to quantum
gravity, see Smolin (2001).
2The quantum gravity project raises a number of philosophical issues, some of
which I shall deal with below (in this paper the hard technical problems associated with
quantum gravity will be ignored). In particular, I will critically examine the motivations
behind quantum gravity and the question of whether such a theory is, if not strictly
necessary, then at least desirable. Furthermore I will address the question of whether a
quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, can fit the bill of being a kind of ultimate
theory which could in principle account for all physical phenomena.
The outline of the paper is as follows. I first (section 2) discuss how the
motivations behind a quantum theory of gravity are related to the ideas of unity and
reductionism in physics. In this connection, I review Bohr’s idea of unity without 
reductionism, and discuss how the enterprise of quantum gravity is related to the
interpretation of quantum mechanics. I then (section 3) briefly review an argument for
the necessity of a quantized theory of gravity, and argue that such a theory is necessary
neither for consistency reasons nor (at least so far) on experimental grounds. In a broad
sense quantum gravity may be conceived of as any theory which couples general
relativity (and thus a classical description of gravity) with quantum theory. I argue that
the expectation–which serves as a motivation for quantum gravity in the broad sense–
that general relativity and quantum theory must be connected in the high energy regime
might be questioned (in particular due to the so-called cosmological constant problem).
In section 4, I put forward an argument which suggests that the eventual construction of
a quantum theory of gravity is not likely to be a fundamental theory in the sense often
advocated (i.e. a theory from which all other theories of, and phenomena in, physics
could be derived). I point out that whatever formal relations can be established between
quantum gravity and the supposedly less fundamental (classical) theories, the latter are
in any case needed to specify the field of application of the former. This raises doubts
concerning the sense in which quantum gravity could be the fundamental theory.
2. Reductionism and the Unity of Physics
The quest for unification is a major drive behind the search for quantum gravity. For
instance, Kiefer (2004, p. 2) writes in the introduction to his recent book on quantum
gravity concerning the main motivations for this theory:
The first motivation is unification. The history of science shows that a
reductionist viewpoint has been very fruitful in physics (Weinberg 1993).
The standard model of particle physics is a quantum field theory that has
united in a certain sense all non-gravitational interactions. [...] The
universal coupling of gravity to all forms of energy would make it
plausible that gravity has to be implemented in a quantum framework too.
As discussed below, it is not always the case that unification coincides with
reductionism. In any case, it is true that the idea of unification between the different
natural phenomena, and the theories that describe them, has been a guiding principle in
physics at least since the days of Galileo.Indeed, the ‘success’history of physics can, at
least partly, be portrayed as the history of unification. Think for example of Newton's
unification of heavenly and terrestrial phenomena by the universality of gravitation; or
Ørsted, Faraday, and Maxwell's unification of electric and magnetic forces embedded in
Maxwell's equations. A more modern example is provided by Glashow, Salam and
Weinberg's electroweak theory of elementary particles which couples electromagnetic
and weak forces (the latter being responsible for certain types of radioactivity). In order
3to see where quantum gravity fits into the unification picture, it is helpful to briefly
review the relations between some of the central theories of physics.
Quantum field theory and general relativity stand as two of the greatest
achievements in 20th century physics.2 Both theories are already unified in the sense that
they combine various former theories in a common framework. Thus, the special theory
of relativity is a combination of electromagnetism and the non-gravitational part of
classical mechanics; and general relativity is a generalization of the special theory in
which gravitation is also included. In a similar manner, quantum field theory is a
combination of special relativity and quantum mechanics. The situation can be
schematically represented as follows (note that only the physical theories relevant for
this paper are included):
Electromagnetic theory Classical Mechanics
Special theory of Relativity Quantum Mechanics
General theory of Relativity Quantum Field Theory
? ?
Quantum Gravity
The arrows in this scheme represent the direction towards deeper or more general layers
in our description of nature (see below). The question marks represent that a theory of
quantum gravity and –more generally –the connection between the quantum (right-
hand) side and general relativity, is still a speculation only.
In various ways the scheme is an expression of reductionism. On the one hand,
the arrows indicate the direction towards something smaller (right hand side). On the
other hand, the arrows indicate the direction towards something more general (both left
and right hand side). A theory of quantum gravity (in particular string theory which
aims to unify all forces known in nature) combines these trends by describing
something both smaller and more general than what is found on the higher levels.3
In accordance with these reductionist trends the higher levels are often seen as
merely useful special cases of the deeper levels. Quantitatively, this thought is backed
by the fact that at least some of the mathematical expressions of the deeper levels are
identical with those of the higher levels in certain limiting cases.4 When such
2 Quantum field theory is here and in the following understood as the common framework for the theory
of light and electrons as fields (quantum electrodynamics), the theory of weak nuclear forces, and the
theory of quarks and gluons. The combination of these theories–known as the standard model of particle
physics–describes the inner structure of atoms via quantum fields.
3 A referee points out that one ought to distinguish between theoretical and ontological reductionism since
the former is much more difficult and limited than the latter. However, this distinction is not without
problems in the quantum context. For instance, while modern physics asserts that matter is made up of
atoms, any adequate description of these objects (and the precise sense in which they constitute matter)
requires quantum theory. Moreover, recent studies (of decoherence) have revealed that atoms and
molecules can behave as quantum objects in one context, and as classical objects in another (see e.g.
Arndt et al 1999).
4 As noted e.g. in Weinstein (2005, p. 5), none of the programs for quantum gravity has as yet succeeded
in showing that the less fundamental theories (general relativity in the case of canonical quantum gravity
or general relativity + the standard model of particle physics in the case of string theory) can be obtained
in some limiting case.
4mathematical identity can be established, reductionism contains the possibility of
reconstructing the higher levels from the deeper ones. Indeed, an important motivation
behind the most ambitious quantum gravity program, string theory, is precisely to
reverse the arrows of the above scheme and derive all known physics from a few basic
principles of this theory. This idea is in accordance with Einstein’s declaration from 
1918:
The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal laws from
which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction.5
The Einsteinian ambition is thus not just a reduction to more fundamental theories–that
is, either to dissect objects into smaller and smaller parts or show that theories on a
higher level are special cases of those of a deeper level (or both in the case of string
theory). Also, and more explicitly in the quote, the idea is reconstructing the universe
from scratch. That is, if we have the universal laws described by a fundamental theory,
and we have identified the fundamental constituents of matter, then we can derive –at
least in principle–all phenomena in the universe (modulo the indeterminism stemming
from quantum theory), as well as the theories describing these phenomena.6 A
contemporary expression of such an ambitious reductionism/reconstructivism can be
found in Tegmark and Wheeler (2001). These authors include a much more general
scheme than the one above, in which subjects such as chemistry, biology, psychology
and sociology are all seen as derived from fundamental physics.
Unity without reductionism?
Various doubts can be raised against reductionism. Often the debate is focused on the
notion of emergence–the question of whether new and irreducible phenomena exist at
the higher levels of description (irreducible in the sense that the emergent phenomena
cannot be explained by the deeper level).7 For the subsequent discussion on how much
can be expected from a theory of quantum gravity, however, it will be more useful to
briefly review a different anti-reductionistic argument which can be associated with
Bohr’s insistence on the necessity of classical physics in the description of quantum
phenomena. If correct, this argument demonstrates not only that phenomena of (some
of) the higher levels cannot be reduced to (or reconstructed from) the deeper ones, but
also that the phenomena of the deeper levels cannot be defined, and are therefore
dependent on, (some of) the higher levels.
Bohr contended that we cannot account for (or understand) the quantum
phenomena –for instance the motion of an atom, or the interference pattern in the
famous double-slit experiment –unless reference is made to a specific experimental
5 The quote is from a conference entitled ‘Principles of research’delivered in Berlin in connection with
the 60th birthday of Max Planck.
6 It should be noted that Einstein was unsatisfied with quantum theory as a final theory and would
therefore, presumably, not have agreed with quantum gravity being a candidate for such a unified theory.
Indeed, Einstein did not engage in quantum gravity debates and instead worked, until his death in 1955,
on a classical unified theory of physics (attempting to combine electromagnetism and gravity), see
Stachel (1999).
7 Note that some proponents of emergent phenomena still agree with reductionism but reject
reconstructionism. For instance, Anderson (1972) holds that “The ability to reduce everything to simple 
fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe”. 
Precisely how the relation between different levels should then be understood, however, is unclear; see
e.g. Cat (1998) for a critical discussion of Anderson’s view and for a detailed discussion of the
relationship between unity, emergence, and (different notions of) reductionism in modern physics.
5context in which the measurement apparatus must be described by the concepts of
classical physics, see e.g. Bohr (1958, p. 4). The idea of being described by classical
physics concepts implies that the measurement apparatus –in contrast to quantum
systems –has well-defined values of both position and momentum, and thus it is not
subject to any quantum uncertainties or superpositions. According to Bohr a main
reason for the necessity of this distinction between the quantum objects and the
measuring instrument is that the interaction between the object and the apparatus is a
defining feature of the quantum phenomena (Bohr 1958, p. 4).
Of course, Bohr’s view is just one of a number of proposed alternative
interpretations of quantum theory. Most of these alternatives follow the line of von
Neumann and attempt (in a reductionist spirit) to treat the measurement apparatus itself
as a quantum system. As is well known, however, such approaches run into the
notorious measurement problem. Stated briefly, the problem is that if everything,
including measurement apparatuses, is quantum (and thus correctly described by
Schrödinger’sequation), then we ought to see superpositions in the measurement
outcomes, e.g. apparatus pointers being in various positions at the same time–and that
clearly contradicts what we in fact do see. Responding to this problem involves
invoking assumptions–such as many worlds, hidden variables, or modified dynamics–
which go beyond the quantum formalism itself to somehow ‘explain away’ why no 
quantum strangeness is seen in the measurement results (for an overview of proposed
responses to the measurement problem, and their problems, see e.g. Albert 1992).8
Bohr actually agreed that the measurement apparatus can also be described by
quantum theory. However, he writes (1939, p. 104):
...in each case some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales and
clocks which determine the frame of space-time coordination–on which,
in the last resort, even the definitions of momentum and energy quantities
rest – must always be described entirely on classical lines, and
consequently kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical
treatment.
The point is that we can treat a measuring apparatus (or part of this) as a quantum
system, but only when some other system is then treated classically. This requirement
guarantees, in consistency with what we observe, that measurements do indeed have
definite outcomes.9 Thus Bohr can effectively be taken to argue that any system, at least
in principle, can be treated quantum mechanically, but that not all systems can be
treated that way at the same time. This means that to those who hold that all objects are
quantum in some ontological sense, Bohr might well have responded that although the
existence of both measurement apparatuses and, say, atoms are beyond doubt –we
cannot say exactly what these objects are like. All which can be inferred is that in some
8 Note that even if some of these ‘quantum reductionist’ approaches (in which al systems are treated as 
being quantum) are taken as adequate responses to the measurement problem, the general reductionist
program in physics is not automaticaly vindicated. For instance, hidden variable theories like Bohm’s 
and the spontaneous collapse models of Ghiradi, Rimini and Weber have been charged of being
incompatible with special relativity (see e.g. Barrett 2000 and 2003).
9 See Howard (1994) for an interesting suggestion of how Bohr’s ideas on this point might be 
reconstructed and understood in terms of entanglement between the measurement apparatus and the
quantum object under investigation. Howard hints (1994, p. 204) that Bohr’s insistence on classical
descriptions can be understood without assuming any “..fundamental ontological or epistemological 
distinction [between the classical and the quantum]”. I do not agree with this claim but I cannot argue the 
point here.
6circumstances objects can be described as if they were quantum and in other
circumstances as if they were classical.10
These brief remarks cannot, of course, constitute a comprehensive analysis of
Bohr’s view –and much less a satisfactory defence of it. But they indicate one way to
have unity without reductionism. For if quantum physics (and quantum phenomena)
cannot be understood without classical physics (and classical phenomena, e.g. objects
with well-defined values of both position and momentum), it is altogether unclear what
it would mean to reduce the latter to the former.11 And unity is not denied if this is taken
to mean that entities and phenomena of two theories are interconnected but not
reducible to each other. Indeed, Bohr emphasized both that, on the one hand, classical
physics is necessary to define quantum phenomena, and, on the other hand, quantal laws
are needed to explain the stability of classical objects (see e.g. Bohr 1958, p. 2).
This brief discussion illustrates that a motivation for quantum gravity based on
an appeal to reductionism in physics can be resisted –even while the quest for unity is
maintained. More importantly, as we shall see in section 4, there is a sense in which
Bohr’s insistence on the necessity of classical physics for understanding quantum
physics might be vindicated in connection with specifying the field of application for a
quantum theory of gravity.
3. Is a theory of quantum gravity necessary?
Considerations of whether or not reductionism has been a successful doctrine in physics
would, of course, be largely irrelevant for motivating the project of quantum gravity if
such a theory were in any case needed on experimental or logical grounds. With respect
to the latter, Bryce DeWitt argued in the early 1960s that just as the electromagnetic
field must be quantized to be consistent with quantum mechanics, the gravitational field
should be quantized for the same consistency reason. DeWit’sargument (1962), which
has since been repeated by other physicists, rests on two premises; 1) the existence of
logical arguments for the quantization of the electromagnetic field; and 2) that the
electromagnetic case is sufficiently analogous to the gravitational case. According to
DeWitt and others, the first premise is supposed to follow from a famous analysis from
1933 in which Bohr and Rosenfeld discussed the measurability of the quantized
electromagnetic field. In particular, the Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis is claimed to show that
the uncertainty relations for a charged particle interacting with an electromagnetic field
necessitates that the electromagnetic field is also quantized.
10 Of course, many scholars have been dissatisfied with Bohr’s ‘dissolution’ of the measurement problem 
(by always having part of the system being described classicaly). Among the problems with Bohr’s 
account are that there is no clear prescription of how the borderline between the classical and the quantum
should be made (rather it is context dependent from case to case), see e.g. Bell (2004, p.171); and that is
does not give an account of (but rather black-boxes) exactly what happens in a measurement situation,
that is, how precisely the classical apparatus interacts with the quantum object, see e.g. Howard (1994, p.
211).
11 Note that this is not in conflict with the formalistic fact that quantum expressions may correspond to
classical expressions in certain limiting cases. One way in which classical mechanics may be said to be a
limiting case of quantum mechanics is via the so-caled Ehrenfest’s theorem which is the quantum 
mechanical equivalent of Newton’s second law. However, since this theorem involves mean (or 
expectation) values of quantum operators, and since such expectation values are bound up with the
quantum mechanical measurement process, there is – in spite of formal identity of Ehrenfest’s theorem 
and Newton’s second law in certain limits –no question of deriving classical behaviour from the quantum
formalism, see e.g. Joos et al (2003, p. 87). For examples of how, on a Bohrian understanding, quantum
mechanics coincide with (but do not reduce) classical physics in certain limits, e.g. via the
correspondence principle, see Falkenburg (1998).
7Rosenfeld himself, however, saw matters differently. Although he had been the first to
try to construct a theory of quantum gravity (in 1930), he later expressed hesitations
towards the project –in particular because there was no experimental evidence for any
quantum efects of gravity (this is stil true, see below). With respect to DeWit’s 
argument, Rosenfeld (1963) pointed out that the Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis showed the
consistency of the electromagnetic field quantization (i.e. that it is possible to treat the
electromagnetic field with quantum principles), not its necessity. Furthermore,
Rosenfeld argued that the analogy between the gravitational and the electromagnetic
field(DeWit’s second premise) is problematic due to the appearance of a definite scale
for space and time intervals in the quantum theory of gravity. Such length and time
scales, referred to as Planck scales, result from the combination of Newton’s 
gravitational constant G, Planck’s constant , and the speed of light c –the Planck
length is 3351 10,/cG cm, and the Planck time is 435 10cG / seconds. Rosenfeld
notes that such small length and time scales may not be well-defined since
considerations of an analogous case from quantum electrodynamics in which scales are
involved (when the charge and current distributions are quantized) suggest an absolute
limit to space-time localization given by the proton radius, 1310 cm, which is 20 orders
of magnitude larger than the Planck length scale (see also Rosenfeld 1966, p. 605).
Finally, Rosenfeld stressed that the eventual construction of a quantum theory of gravity
could not essentially change the fundamental role of classical theory for the
understanding of quantum theory. Commenting on the early Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis,
he wrote (Rosenfeld 1963, p. 443):
The ultimate necessity of quantizing the electromagnetic field (or any
other field) can only be founded on experience, and all that considerations
of measurability of field components can do is to illustrate the consistency
of the way in which the mathematical formalism of a theory embodying
such quantization is linked with the classical concepts on which its use in
analysing the phenomena rests.
Thus, Rosenfeld most likely agreed with Bohr’s vision of the unity of physics implying 
that quantum gravity could not possibly be a final theory from which classical physics
(and classical phenomena) can be derived.
Recent studies have shown that the situation concerning the necessity of
quantizing the gravitational field has remained essentialy unchanged since Rosenfeld’s 
remarks. Thus, Callender and Huggett (2001) and Wüthrich (2004), reviewing and
evaluating arguments concerning the necessity of quantization, both argue that there are
no convincing reasons to affirm that gravity must be quantized. However, all of these
authors agree that a theory of quantum gravity –understood in the broad sense as any
theory which couples general relativity and quantum theory–is nevertheless desirable,
and that there are situations in which such a theory is needed. We turn to their
arguments below after a quick look at the empirical situation.
Quantum gravity vs. observations and experiments
No observations or experiments have so far observed any quantum effects of gravity.
This is, however, not surprising since quantum effects of gravity are expected to show
up primarily at the above mentioned Planck scales. The most likely observational
signatures of quantum gravity are to be found in the very early (small time scale)
universe, or the extreme conditions (high energy scale) associated with black holes (see
8below)–and none of these regions are easy to access observationally.12 Another option
for probing quantum gravity effects is to try to access the Planck scales via
experimental studies of phenomena at very small length scales. Such experimental
studies, however, seem remote. For instance, Baez (2001) notes:
To study a situation where both general relativity and quantum field
theory are important, we could try to compress a cell to a size 10-20 times
that of a proton. We know no reason why this is impossible in principle,
but we have no idea how to actually accomplish such a feat.
Nevertheless, as another motivation for quantum gravity it is sometimes mentioned (e.g.
Callender and Huggett 2001, p. 5) that although no effects of quantum gravity has been
seen, experiments have established that classical gravity is indeed related to (non-
relativistic) quantum theory. One such experiment used a so-called neutron
interferometer to demonstrate that the gravitational field affects the behaviour of
quantum systems such as a beam of neutrons (see e.g. Greenberger and Overhauser
1980). The fact remains, however, that there is a big step from the relation between
classical gravity and quantum mechanics to quantum effects of gravity itself. For
instance, there are no experimental signatures of a relation between quantum field
theory (like quantum electrodynamics) and gravity.13 On the one hand, the absence of
such experimental signatures is not surprising since quantum field theory deals almost
exclusively with microscopic systems (in contrast to e.g. the neutron interferometer
which allows for a test of quantum mechanics at the macroscopic level) and since the
gravitational force is very small in the microphysical domain. On the other hand, this
situation emphasizes how difficult it is to establish whether there are any quantum
effects of gravity (as a quantized field) or even any observational effects of a coupling
between general relativity (gravity as a classical field) and quantum field theory.
Alternative relationships between general relativity and quantum theory?
Given that quantization of the gravitational field is not required on consistency or
empirical grounds, it is natural to ask how the relationship between general relativity
and quantum theory could be conceived in case the gravitational field is not quantized.
For instance, Butterfield and Isham have remarked (Butterfield and Isham 2001, p. 57):
If it is indeed wrong to quantise the gravitational field […] it becomes an 
urgent question how matter –which presumably is subject to the laws of
quantum theory–should be incorporated in the overall scheme.
As we shall see, the urgency of this question depends on how relevant (experimentally
and observationaly) such an ‘overal scheme’ is–and, of course, whether there is one!
In his 1963 paper Rosenfeld argued that since there is no experimental need for
quantizing gravity, it is better to stick with the so-called semi-classical gravity, which
combines a classical description of the gravitational field with a quantum treatment of
12 Other effects are being contemplated within the field known as quantum gravity phenomenology. For
instance, it has been suggested that quantum gravity effects could be responsible for certain puzzling
observations of cosmic rays. The situation, however, is still far from settled; see e.g. Amelino-Camelia
(2003).
13 The so-called Unruh-Davies effect and the Hawking radiation from black holes are theoretical
phenomena which are predicted from a relation between quantum field theory and gravity, but so far they
have not received empirical support.
9all other force fields and matter. Technically, the left hand side of the classical Einstein
equation, describing the curvature of space-time, is equated with the quantum
expectation value of the so-called energy-momentum tensor which is a measure of the
energy associated with (quantum) matter and radiation:

 T
c
G
RgR
4
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2
1 (1)
where R and R refer to the curvature of space-time, g is the metric, and T the
energy-momentum tensor. However, this equation is problematic–not least because the
quantum expectation value on the right hand side is calculated in a fixed space-time
background, whereas the left hand side describes a dynamical space-time (this leads to
difficult non-linearity and back-reaction problems; see e.g. Callender and Huggett
(2001) and Rugh and Zinkernagel (2002)). Such problems are sometimes used to argue
that the semi-classical approach, at least in its simplest form given by equation (1), is
not likely to be the fundamental theory describing the interaction between general
relativity and quantum field theory; see e.g. Kiefer (2004, p. 14 ff.).
But if there is no strict need to quantize gravity, and if semi-classical gravity is a
problematic answer to the question of the relationship between general relativity and
quantum theory, could one then not choose to forget about the whole business of
quantum gravity? Callender and Huggett (2001, p. 4) comments on this possibility:
Another philosophical position, which we might dub the ‘disunified 
physics’ view might in this context claim that general relativity describes 
certain aspects of the world, quantum mechanics other distinct aspects,
and that would be that. According to this view, physics (and indeed,
science) need not offer a single universal theory encompassing all
physical phenomena. We shall not debate the correctness of this view here
but we would like to point out that if physics aspires to provide a
complete account of the world, as it traditionally has, then there must be a
quantum theory of gravity [in the general sense of a connection between
general relativity and quantum theory]. The simple reason is that general
relativity and quantum mechanics cannot both be correct even in their
domains of applicability.
As a first argument for this conclusion Callender and Huggett mention that the two
theories “..cannot both be universal in scope, for the latter strictly predicts that all
matter is quantum, and the former only describes the gravitational effects of classical
mater..”. Now, for all the impressive empirical successes of quantum theory, it does
not predict that all matter is quantum. This conclusion only follows by adopting an
ontological interpretation of quantum theory according to which, indeed, everything
ultimately is quantum. I have already mentioned that, on Bohr’s view, this move can be
resisted insofar as objects are not either quantum or classical (even if, say, macroscopic
systems are more prone to a classical description than are microscopic systems).
Whatever the plausibility of Bohr’s position, however, Calender and Hugget 
offer a further argument for their conclusion that general relativity and quantum theory
must somehow interact (this is a common argument, contained also in the quote by
Kiefer in section 2): The Einstein field equation couples the gravitational field, and thus
the space-time structure, to all matter and energy. And,
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[q]uantum fields carry energy and mass; therefore, if general relativity is
true, quantum fields distort the curvature of spacetime and the curvature
of spacetime affects the motion of the quantum fields. If these theories are
to yield a complete account of physical phenomena, there will be no way
to avoid those situations –involving very high energies –in which there
are non-negligible interactions between the quantum and gravitational
fields...
As I will discuss further below, the situations where such interactions become relevant
are mostly associated with the very early universe or with speculative features of black
holes. Now, it could be objected that these situations are not relevant (at least yet), since
there are still no experimental or observational evidence which make them so. This
could for instance be argued within the framework of Cartwright’s ‘Dappled World’–
which might well be the implicit target for Callender and Huggett’sreluctance towards
‘disunified physics’. Cartwright argues (1999, p. 24 ff.) that we have no reasons to
believe our theories outside the domain where the successes of these theories have been
established or, at least, not outside the domain where an adequate model of the
phenomena in question can be formulated –and in this sense physical theories should
not be expected to give a complete account of physical phenomena. For instance,
Cartwright holds that a 1000 dollar bill swept away by the wind cannot be taken to
follow Newton’s second law since no good-fitting molecular (or otherwise) model of
the wind is available. In the absence of such a model, on Cartwright’s view, the belief 
that the wind operates on the bank note via forces is “..another expression of 
fundamentalist faith”(1999, p. 28). However, as Hoefer (2003, p. 1408) reasonably
complains, Cartwright’s rejection to make inductive inferences from our successful
theories to not easily modelled cases comes dangerously close to reject making any
inductions at all!
Nevertheless, without commiting myself to Cartwright’s general thesis, I do
think a bit of scepticism about the scope of our inductions is in order in the present case.
For there are reasons to suspect that our intuitions about the relationship between
general relativity and quantum (field) theory are insufficient to allow extrapolations
(inductions) into the very high energy regime. I am here thinking in particular of the so-
called cosmological constant problem which might threaten the very idea of a formal
connection (like equation 1, or any other type of coupling) between quantum field
theory and general relativity. In essence the problem is that whereas quantum field
theory predicts an astronomically high value for T –implying an extreme curvature
of space-time –it is observationally known that space-time is flat or almost flat.14 The
cosmological constant problem, which is so far unsolved, is conceived to be a ‘veritable 
crisis’ for fundamental physics, see Weinberg (1989). As discussed in Rugh and
Zinkernagel (2002), the problem rests fundamentally on two assumptions –both of
which can be questioned: (i) The quantum field theoretic vacuum energy is physically
real (as in the standard interpretation of quantum field theory); and (ii) the validity of
some semi-classical approach in which quantum (vacuum) energy acts as a source in
Einstein’s field equation. This last assumption implies a formal coupling between
general relativity and quantum field theory, and the cosmological constant problem
14 More precisely, when the expectation value of T is evaluated in the vacuum state, it takes the same
form as the cosmological constant in general relativity (this constant has, for simplicity, not been included
in equation 1).
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could therefore be argued to constitute a threat to the idea of a connection between these
two theories.15
Thus, the apparently straightforward assumption made by Callender and Huggett
that general relativity couples to all forms of (quantum) energy might be questioned. In
any case, the cosmological constant problem suggests that our understanding of the
connection between general relativity and quantum field theory is (still) too premature
to trust extrapolations into the high energy regime. I emphasize that this does not
constitute an argument to the effect that general relativity and quantum field theory are
not connected. It is rather that, given the present unclear situation surrounding the
cosmological constant problem, all cards should be left on the table.
So much by way of sketching how some of the motivations behind the search for
a quantum theory of gravity –either as a theory of quantized gravity or in the broad
sense of a theory which couples general relativity and quantum theory –could perhaps
be resisted. In the following section, I will disregard possible scepticism as concerns the
motivations for quantum gravity, and instead ask how much would be accomplished if
such a theory is eventually constructed.
4. Could quantum gravity be the fundamental theory?
Although a quantum theory of gravity in which gravity is quantized has still not been
found, the eventual construction of such a theory is often associated with at least two
conjectures:
1. Quantum gravity will imply that our usual classical notions of space and time
are only approximate valid concepts (valid at our length and time scales), which
somehow emerge from the ‘real’ quantum nature of space and time; see e.g.
Butterfield and Isham (1999).
2. More generally, quantum gravity will provide the ultimate explanation of
classical physics from a deeper quantum physics level (for instance from string
theory); see e.g. Weinberg (1993) and Tegmark and Wheeler (2001).
I have already indicated that the second of these (reductionist) conjectures is in conflict
with Bohr’s thesis that classical physics is necessary to account for the quantum
phenomena, and, as I shall briefly hint below, the first conjecture is also problematic
from a Bohrian perspective. Not surprisingly, therefore, many physicists working on
quantum gravity (and quantum cosmology) often appeal to some version of the
Everettian many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics; see e.g. Butterfield and
Isham (1999, p. 144). Disregarding the other alternative interpretations of quantum
mechanics, it may therefore seem as if one is faced with a choice between Bohr’s ‘one
world-two theories’, or Everet’s ‘one theory-many worlds’. While I cannot, of course,
attempt to seriously adjudicate between these interpretations here, I will suggest that
Bohr’s idea of the necessity of classical physics cannot be as easily dismissed in
15 It should be mentioned that the cosmological constant problem has also been read as an argument for
the necessity of quantum gravity –and solutions to the problem have been proposed within this
framework (and the related idea of quantum cosmology), see also Zinkernagel (2002). Apart from the fact
that no general framework for quantum gravity exists as yet, however, these solutions seem to be
problematic, see Weinberg (1989, p. 20ff.) for discussion and references.
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discussions of quantum gravity as is sometimes suggested.16 This suggestion can be
developed by asking how the theory of quantum gravity is supposed to work without
classical physics.
As we have seen above, it is usually assumed that the effects of quantum gravity
should become relevant at very small (Planck) time- and length-scales, respectively
~10–43 sec and ~10–33 cm. There are two types of situations, both involving very high
energies, where these effects should manifest themselves. The first is the very early
universe where the extreme conditions near the Big Bang are expected to make Planck
scale physics necessary (the high energies near the Big Bang results because the time
parameter in this cosmological model is inversely proportional to the square of the
temperature –and hence to energy). The second situation is connected to black holes.
These exotic objects, which are supposedly common in the universe, are expected to
gradually lose energy (Hawking radiation). Due to curious effects of so-called black
hole thermodynamics, the final stages of a black hole is supposed to be characterized by
energy loss in the form of radiation in which each photon has an energy close to the
Planck energy. Consequently, it is expected that this final stage can only be understood
by a full quantum theory of gravity (in which gravity is quantized); see e.g. Smolin
(2001, p. 92). Moreover, quantum gravity is also expected to describe the black hole
singularity at–or very near–the center of a black hole.
It is sometimes said that since general relativity predicts space-time singularities
(the Big Bang and the center of black holes), this theory predicts its own demise as it is
unable to describe the vicinity of these singularities (due to quantum gravity effects). As
discussed below, however, theoretical (and observational) access to either the very early
universe or black holes relies firmly on classical theory –namely classical general
relativity. This seems to imply that one must presuppose classical theories in order to
define the field of application for quantum gravity. If this is correct then it at least limits
the sense in which general relativity can be reduced to quantum gravity. On the other
hand, the formalism of general relativity is expected to be derivable from an eventual
theory of quantum gravity in some limiting case. This situation is somewhat analogous
to Bohr’s view on the role of classical mechanics in quantum mechanics. For instance,
Landau and Lifshitz –quoting Bohr approvingly –wrote in the introduction to their
book on quantum mechanics (1981, p. 3):
Thus quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place among physical
theories: it contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same
time it requires this limiting case for its own formulation.
A way to understand this claim is, as we have seen, that formal identities between
quantum and classical expressions notwithstanding, the measurement problem implies
that quantum theory by itself cannot account for any classical phenomena –such as
definite measurement outcomes with well-defined space-time and energy-momentum
properties. I should note that the above mentioned necessity of general relativity for
quantum gravity is only somewhat analogous to the necessity of classical mechanics for
quantum mechanics –for the role of the classical theory in the former case is not to
account for observed phenomena but rather to specify the field of application of the
quantum theory. Nevertheless, in the case of quantum gravity, it is much less obvious
that one can circumvent the need for a classical theory by opting for a different
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
16 An example of a dismissive evaluation of Bohr’s position in connection with quantum gravity can be 
found in Butterfield and Isham (1999, p. 143).
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The problems of time
In order to spell out more clearly the way in which classical physics is presupposed in
defining the field of application of quantum gravity, I shall briefly consider the role of
the concept of time in the very early universe. Although quantum gravity is supposed to
fundamentally change our usual notion of time, it is notoriously difficult to see how the
notion of time employed in the less fundamental theories could somehow emerge from
quantum gravity. For instance, the central equation in canonical quantum gravity, the
Wheeler-DeWitt equation, does not depend on time at all, and this obviously makes it
hard to see how the equation can be relevant for theoretical descriptions of the very
early (but evolving) universe. This much discussed ‘problem of time’ in quantum 
gravity is a consequence of the very different role that time plays in quantum theory
(where it is a fixed background parameter) and general relativity (where time is
dynamical and depends on the matter-energy distribution).17 But apart from the problem
of how time could emerge from timeless quantum gravity (which is closely related to
the ‘problem of time’, see e.g. Butterfield and Isham 1999), it is also hard to make sense
of the “reverse” transition from time in the early universe to timeless quantum gravity. 
This problem, which could be called the reverse problem of time, arises as
follows: As mentioned above, it is conjectured that quantum gravity (and quantum
cosmology) will be particularly relevant for discussing the conditions in the very early
universe where quantum effects of gravity are expected to be important. But any
discussion of the ‘early’ universe obviously requires that we have a cosmic time concept
which indicates that we are close (temporally) to the Big Bang singularity. Indeed, a
cosmic time concept is one of the fundamental ingredients in the Big Bang model of the
universe.18 The cosmic time parameter is the proper time of a standard clock (for
instance, an imagined perfect wrist watch) at rest in the so-called co-moving frame, and
it is this time concept physicists and cosmologists have in mind when discussing
conditions in the early universe. Indeed, the Planck scale is reached in cosmology by
extrapolating backwards the Big Bang model in this cosmic time. Thus, the assumption
that quantum gravity (or quantum cosmology) is relevant for the study of the very early
universe rests on a solid classical (i.e. not described by a quantum operator) notion of
time. But if it is conjectured that timeless quantum gravity is the fundamental theory –
from which classical physics and concepts can be derived –it appears paradoxical that
its central field of application (the early universe) is only defined by a concept (classical
cosmic time) which is completely alien to the theory.
The above argument may be seen as a particular instance of Bohr’s (and
Rosenfeld’s) point that classical physics and classical concepts are necessary in order to
define and analyze the quantum phenomena. Thus, whether or not one agrees with Bohr
that we need classical physics to relate the quantum formalism with measurements, the
very definition of the central field of application for quantum gravity rests on classical
concepts.19 As already hinted, it is difficult to circumvent this argument by referring to
17 Kiefer (2004, p. 4) mentions the problem of time as the third main motivation behind the search of a
quantum theory of gravity. However, this motivation only makes sense when it is already assumed that
general relativity and quantum theory must be brought together in a unified framework (Kiefer’s first 
motivation) or, at least, that there are situations where both of these theories are relevant (Kiefer’s second 
motivation).
18 In general, there is no global time parameter in classical general relativity, but such a parameter is part
of the particular Big Bang solution to Einstein's field equations which is assumed to be a reasonable
approximate description of our universe.
19 A similar point may be argued for the case of quantum gravity effects related to black holes. I leave it
out here however, since such effects in a sense are even more remote than those related to the very early
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other interpretations of quantum theory, as also such other interpretations will have to
rely on a classical notion of time in order to discuss the early universe. In turn, if we
cannot even discuss the central application of quantum gravity without assuming a
classical time concept, it is not clear what we should understand by an assumption like
‘the ultimate nature of space-time is non-classical’ and, more generaly, what we should 
understand by the assumption that ‘classical physics can ultimately be explained from
the deeper level of quantum gravity’. 
It should finally be noted that not all researchers in quantum gravity subscribe to
the reductionist conjectures associated with the theory (related to an ‘al is quantum’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics). Thus, Rovelli mentions in the conclusion of his
recent book on quantum gravity (2004, p. 370):
I see no reason why a quantum theory of gravity should not be sought
within a standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (whatever one
prefers). [...] We can consistently use the Copenhagen interpretation to
describe the interaction between a macroscopic classical apparatus and a
quantum gravitational phenomenon happening, say, in a small region of
(macroscopic) spacetime. The fact that the notion of spacetime breaks
down at short scale within this region does not prevent us from having the
region interacting with an external Copenhagen observer.
Now, on Bohr’s version of the Copenhagen interpretation, the important point is not the
observer but rather that the measurement apparatus is to be described on classical lines.
In any case, and in the light of the above discussion, I think the quote expresses a highly
recommendable attitude –namely that the search for quantum gravity should not a
priori exclude specific interpretations of quantum mechanics.In fact, Roveli’s idea that
space-time breaks down within a small macroscopic space-time region might support
the idea that classical space-time concepts (e.g. the macroscopic region surrounding the
‘breakdown region’) are needed to formulate the ‘domain of application’ of quantum 
gravity–and can in this way hardly be seen to be derivable from this theory.20
I do not claim, however, that Rovelli would endorse this conclusion. For one
thing, the close connection between quantum gravity and quantum cosmology (in which
even the universe as a whole is described in quantum terms), and in particular the fact
that quantum gravity (also on Roveli’s view) is held to be relevant for the very early 
universe, would seem to make it difficult to accommodate either classical apparatus or
classical concepts (such as a macroscopic region of space-time) at the very early stages
of the universe. In any case, I think Rovelli would have to accept that these early stages
universe: There is good empirical evidence of a universal expansion and thus of a smaller and denser state
of the universe in the past. To reach the very early universe we therefore ‘only’ need to extrapolate
backwards an empirical successful model (see however hesitations to this extrapolations in Rugh and
Zinkernagel 2006). By contrast, since Hawking radiation from black holes has not yet been observed, and
since nothing is known about the interior of black holes, it would seem that more than extrapolations of
successful models are involved in contemplating quantum gravity effects in connection with black holes.
20 Perhaps this could be taken to mean that on a Bohrian understanding of quantum theory, the
quantization of the gravitational field, and therefore of space-time, can be done only ‘locally’ (within a 
classically described space-time volume). This would be in accordance with the quote by Bohr in section
2 according to which an ultimate measurement apparatus which determine a spatio-temporal framework
for the quantum phenomena must be described by classical physics concepts (in particular, this would fit
with a relationist account of space-time which links classical space-time to classically described rods and
clocks, see e.g. Teller (1999) and Rugh and Zinkernagel (2006b)).
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can only be addressed (and observationally accessed) via the classical time concept of
standard cosmology.
Summary and Conclusions
A quantum theory of gravity is presently considered the holy grail of theoretical
physics. In this manuscript I have tried to argue that the motivations behind the quest
for this theory may be resisted, and that–in any case–there are good reasons to doubt
that it can be the ‘theory of everything’. More specifically:
By reviewing Bohr’s conception of quantum mechanics, I have first illustrated
one way to question reductionism in physics. Since reductionism serves as a motivation
for quantum gravity, this shows a sense in which quantum gravity depends on
interpretative issues in quantum theory. Secondly, I pointed out that there is no
compelling argument to the effect that quantum gravity is necessary–neither logically
nor (at least, as yet) empirically. Furthermore, as discussed in section 3, even the more
modest ‘unified physics’ expectation that general relativity and quantum theory must
somehow come together at high energy could be resisted. Both because of the lack of
empirical evidence of any interplay between general relativity and quantum theory and
–in particular–due to our limited understanding of the form of such interplay (even at
low energy) evidenced by the cosmological constant problem. Finally, I have argued
that even if a theory of quantum gravity –in a form in which gravity is quantized –
could be constructed, there are good reasons to believe that this would not remove the in
principle necessity of classical physics, at least for specifying the field of application of
quantum gravity. Obviously, it is hard to make predictions concerning what a quantum
theory of gravity will eventually look like. But at least there are reasons to believe that
quantum gravity will not supersede present physics in the sense that all other physical
theories and phenomena can (even in principle) be derived from, for instance, some
future form of string theory.
None of this, of course, should be taken to imply a recommendation that the
quest for a quantum theory of gravity ought not to be pursued. All I suggest is that the
motivations behind this quest can be resisted, and that a bit of scepticism concerning
what could actually be achieved with such a theory seems appropriate.
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